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ACTION.
Breach of Promise-Incapacity to Contract.-A promise to marry
made by a person physically and incurably impotent is contrary to the
statutory policy of the state, and its breach will not constitute a cause
of action: Gulick v. Gulick, 12 Vroom.
ADMINISTRATOR.
Bill by, to -remove Cloud.-An administrator, taking neither an estate,
title nor interest in the lands of his intestate, cannot maintain a bill to
remove a cloud from such lands. He takes a mere power to sell to pay
debts of the intestate, and if he sells for that purpose, he must take the
land as he finds it: Ryan v. Duncan, 88 Ills.
AGENT

When Principal Bound.-Where a son is suffered to act as a general
agent for his father, both in buying and selling articles in the father's
line of business, the public will be justified in assuming that the son
possessed all the powers of a general agent, in buying and selling, and
the father will be liable for goods ordered by the son in his father's
name, suited to his business, though the son uses them himself: Thurber v. Anderson, 88 Ills.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

Presentment After the Yerm.-A bill of exceptions, filed after the
term, will not be considered, unless it appears by an entry of record
that the opposing party consented t' the filing. An entry showing
merely that he was present when the court gave the appellant leave to
file it out of time, is not sufficient ; nor will the defect be cured by an
entry subsequently made by the clerk, in vacation, reciting that consent
was given: State v. Duckworth, 68 'Mo.
Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1878. The cases will probably be reported in 8 or 9 Otto.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 88 Ills. Reports.
S From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 48 Maryland Reports.
' From H. A. Chaney, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 Michigan Reports.
5 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 68 Missouri Reports.
6 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 12 of his reports.
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BILLS AND NOTES. See Evidence.
EJndorsementof Waiver of Protest.-The endorsement by the payee
of a promissory note, that he holds himself "responsible for the within
note, without notice or protest," is of no other effect than to waive protest and notice as a necessary step to fix his liability in case the drawer
fails to pay the note at maturity: Halley v. Jackson, 48 Md.
The liability of the maker and endorser of such note is several, and
it is error to proceed against them as if they were jointly bound : Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Limitations, Statute of; .Municipal
Corporation
COURTS.

Jurisdiction.-Illegality in the service of process by which jurisdiction is to be obtained, is not waived by the special appearance of
defendant to move that the service be set aside; nor after such motion
is denied, by his answering to the merits. Objection to the illegal
service is considered as abandoned, only when the party pleads to the
merits in the first instance, without insisting upon the illegality: Harkness v. Hyde, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Accomplice- Testifying in behalf of the State.-Where an accomplice is convicted after having been made a witness by the state, and
received as such by the court, and after having made an ingenuous confession, such accomplice has an equitable claim to a judicial recommendation-to the mercy of the pardoning power, which cannot be withheld
without a violation of an established rule of practice: State v. Graham,
12 Vroom.
It is competent for the court to order the accomplice to be acquitted
at the trial, for the purpose of qualifying him as a witness for the state,
or to accept from the defendant a plea admitting guilt to such a degree
as, in the opinion of the court, is requisite ; or for the court to assent
to the entering of a nolle prosequi by the attorney-general : Id.
Forgery of Municipal Obligations-Elements of the Crime.-It is
not essential to the crime of forgery, that the person in whose name
the instrument purports to be made, shall have legal capacity to make
it. It is sufficient, under Wag. Stat., sect. 16, p. 470, if it is made
with intent to defraud, and on its face would be likely to defraud.
Thus, the making a false municipal certificate of indebtedness, with
intent to injure or defraud, is forgery, notwithstanding the municipality
may have no power to issue such certificates: State v. Eades, 68 Mo.
Indictable Nuisance.-A house in which unlawful sales of liquor
are habitually made, is an indictable nuisance, although there is a city
ordinance prescribing the penalties for such sales, as such traffic is not
only a breach of the city law, but also of the statutory policy of the
state: Meyer v. State, 12 Yroom.
Obtaining Goods under False Pretences.&-An indictment for obtaining
a stock of goods in exchange for a tract of land under false pretences,
charged that defendant designedly, feloniously and falsely pretended that
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hc was the owner of the land, and averred that in truth and in fact he
was not the owner; but did not charge that he knew he was nct the
owner. field, that this was a fatal defect; the scienter should have
been expressly averred ; the use of the word "designedly" did not dispense with it: State v. Bradley, 68 Mo.
The indictment also charged that defendant pretended that he had
an abstract which showed a perfect title in himself; but there was no
averment that he did not have such an abstract. feld, that the absence
of this averment was fatal, and the defect was not supplied by an
averment that defendant well knew the abstract to be imperfect, and
untrue in showing that he had title. If such was the fact, the abstract
should have been set out as a false token or writing, and the defendant
should have been charged with designedly, feloniously and falsely pretending that it was a true abstract, and correctly represented the title to
be in him; and this charge should have been accompanied by a proper
negative and an averment of the scienter: Id.
DAMAGES.

See Frauds,Statute of; Officer.
DEED.

Reformation of-Equity.-Where the terms of a deed are agreed upon
and the parties go to a conveyancer and state such terms to enable him
to draft the deed, and the grantor, afterwards, without the knowledge of
the grantee, gives other directions as to the terms to be inserted, which
are followed, and the grantee accepts the deed, supposing it to be drawn
as agreed upon, a court of equity will reform the deed, the proceeding
being a fraud upon the grantee: Berger v. Ebey, 88 Ills.
EASEMENT.

See Lateral Support.

-

See Receiver.
account, more especially, courts of
of
matters
Account-Laches.-In
equity refuse to interfere after a considerable lapse of time, from considerations of public policy-from the difficulty of doing entire justice between
the parties (which as a court of conscience it is bound to do), where
the transactions have become obscure by time, and the evidence may be
lost: Hall, Adn'r, v. 6'lagett, 48 Md.
Lapse of time may operate as a bar to a decree to account. In equity
laches and neglect are discountenanced. Stale demands without an effort
to enforce them, cannot invoke the aid of a tribunal which only lends
its power to reasonable diligence.
EQUITY.

EVIDENCE.

See Trial.

Bills and Notes-JudicialMotice of 2Yme.-An averment tiet a note,
dated August 12th 1872, at four months, was presented for payment,
December 14th 1872, is sufficient to show a presentment at the proper
time, because the court will take judicial notice, not only of the lawmerchant, but also of the almanac, from which it appears that the 15th
of December 1872 fell on a Sunday: Reed v. Wilson, 12 Vroom.
It must be presumed that the three days of grace allowed by the
general law-merchant are also allowed by the law of Pennsylvania,
where the note was payable: Id.
VoL. XXVII.-74
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Usage-JudicialNotice of Laws of Former Government.-The common usage of any country in reference to its measures should be followed
in estimating such measures when referred to in grants made there:
United States v. Askew, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
The courts of the United States take judicial notice of the laws which
formerly prevailed in countries acquired by the United States, up to
the time of such acquisition. As to such countries, they are not deemed
foreign laws, but the laws of an antecedent government: Id.
The true Mexican vara is slightly less than 33 American inches, but
by use in California, it is estimated at 33 inches, and in Texas at 33J
inches: Id.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

Parties Defendant-Agent.-A writ of restitution in an action of
forcible entry and detainer, will not necessarily be unavailing because
the persons who were living upon the land at the institution of the suit
were not made defendants. If they were the servants of the person
who was made defendant, they can be dispossessed under the writ; and
the fact that defendant does not live in the county where the land lies,
does not alter the case ; De Graw v. Prior, 68 Mo.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Promise to Payfor Services rendered to Another.-Where after three
visits made by a physician to a son-in-law of the defendant, the latter
undertook to be responsible for the payment for the services of the former, and services were subsequently rendered under this promise, the
defendant's promise is an original undertaking as to the subsequent
visits, and he is liable for the reasonable value of such services, but
not for services rendered before his undertaking: King v. Edmiston,
88 Ills.
Verbal Promise to Pay the Debt of Another-Damages.-A verbal
promise to pay the debt of another is within the Statute of Frauds, and
void if made to the creditor; but not if made to the debtor : Prattv.
Bates, 40 Mich.
A man promised certain stocaholders to pay the debts of the corporation, in consideration of which they transferred some of their stock to
him. They were not liable themselves, and were interested only as
stockholders. Failing to pay a certain debt he was sued in assumpsit
by the creditor upon an assignment of this agreement. Held, that the
action did not lie, since nothing was assigned but the damages resulting
to the stockholders from the non-payment of that one debt, and their
interest could not be ascertained in a court of common law, nor severed
from the entire transaction : Id.
The measure of damages for failure to pay the joint obligations of
others, is the whole amount of the debts: Id.
HOMESTEAD.

Abandonment.-Where a mortgagor abandons his homestead, it is
immaterial whether he knew or was ignorant of the fact that the mortgage contained a clause releasing it, at the time be executed the same,
or whether his wife signed or acknowledged the same; the mortgage
will thereby be rendered operative as to the homestead: Cobb v. Smith,
88 Ills.
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INJUNCTION.

When Order for, is same as the Writ.-Where the defendant in a
bill is present when an order for a writ of injunction is granted, and has
full notice thereof, he is bound to observe it, the same as if the writ
were issued, or be in contempt; and on dismissal of the bill, thereby
removing the restraining order, damages may be properly assessed:
Danville Banking and Trust Co. v. Parks, 88 Ills.
INSURANCE.

Liability of Agent for Premiums taken after Company has been
excluded from the State.-An agent of an insurance company, who issues
a policy and takes the premium after the company's certificate of
authority to do business in this state has been revoked by the superintendent of the insurance department, is liable to return the premium, notwithstanding he was not, at the time, aware of the revocation, and the
four weeks' notice of revocation required by Wag. Stat., sect. 32, p. 772,
has not been given by the superintendent: McCutcheon v. Rivers, 68 Mo.
Meaning of "Legal .teirs" in Policy.-A policy of life insurance,
payable to the "legal heirs" of the person whose life is insured, when
he leaves children at his death, is payable to them. His widow in such
case is not included in the words as an heir: Gauch v. St. Louis Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 88 Ill.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

The division of an empire does not of itself destroy rights of property
held by the citizens of its different parts, though situated in a different
division from that in which they may reside: Airhart v. Dexessieu et
al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
A citizen of Mexico was not divested of his title to lands in Texas
by the revolution, nor by the constitution or laws subsequently adopted;
but retained the right to alienate the same, and to transmit the same to
his heirs, being also citizens of Mexico, and such heirs are entitled to
sue for and recover such lands in the courts of Texas: Id.
JUDGMENT.

Time when Lien Attaches.-A judgment has relation to the time when
it is entered up. It will not affect any bonafide conveyance, made for
value before that time, for it only attaches upon that which is then, or
afterwards becomes the property of the debtor; and if the property be
charged in equity before the entry of the judgment, the judgment will
not affect such charge : Dyson v. Simmons, 48 Md.
JURY.
LACHES.

See Trial."
See Equity.

LATERAL SUPPORT.

Right of-Restriction.-Every landowner has a right to have his land
preserved unbroken, and an adjoining owner excavating on his own land
is subject to this restriction, that he must not remove the earth so near
to the land of his neighbor that his neighbor's soil will crumble away
under its own weight and fall upon his land. But this right of lateral
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support extends only to the soil in its natural condition. It does not
protect whatever is placed upon the soil increasing the downward and
lateral pressure. If it. did it would put it in the power of a lotowner,
by erecting heavy buildings on his lot, to greatly abridge the right of
his neighbor to use his lot. It would make the rights of the prior
occupant greatly superior to those of the latter : Northern Transportation
Co. v. CMicago, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
LIMITATIONS,

STATUTE OF.

Defence under is a 1Tested Right.-When a right of action has become
barred under a Statute of Limitation, the statutory defenee is a vested
right, that cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation: Ryder v. Wilson's Executors, 12 Vroom.
In the administration of a decedent's estate, the expiration of the
time for the creditors to present their claims, worked, under the old law,
a bar to claims not presented. Held, that the repeal of the law authorizing this procedure, did not revive the right to enforce, against the
personal representative, such unpresented claims: Id.
The rule and the fact that the claim sued on was not presented within
the time limited, may be pleadedas a bar: Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Termination of Prosecution.-Inan action for malicious prosecution,
the plaintiff must show that the prosecution or proceeding of which he
complains, is legally at an end, and that it was instituted maliciously
and without probable cause: Potter v. Casterine, 12 Vroom.
The legal termination of the prosecution is sufficiently shown by the
refusal of the grand jury to find a bill, without a formal order of discharge by the court: Id.
A rejection of the complaint by the grand jury is prima facie evidence
of want of probable cause : Id.
There is no error in refusing to non-suit, if, from the facts proved, the
jury might infer that the defendant had no actual belief or suspicion
of the plaintiff's guilt: Id.
A defendant in such an action cannot excuse himself by showing that
he acted under the advice of an unprofessional person: Id.
MARRIAGE.

See Action.

See Homestead.
Equitable Mortgage--Enforcement in Equity of a Defective Mortgage.-If a party makes a mortgage or affects to make one, but it proves
to be defective, by reason of some informality or omission, such as failure to record in due time, defective acknowledgment or the like, though
even by the omission of the mortgagee himself, as the instrument is at
least evidence of an agreement to convey, the conscience of the mortgagor is bound and it will be enforced by a court of equity, not only
as against the mortgagor, but as against judgment-creditors of the mortgagor obtaining their judgments subsequent to the date of the mortgage,
except where this principle has been modified by statute: Dyson v.
Simmons, 48 Md.
Removal of Building.-A mortgagor, while he has the right to use
MORTGAGE.
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the mortgaged premises, has none to commit waste, or to remove ouildings therefrom, or to do any other act impairing the security; and the
removal of a house from the premises may be enjoined in equity, or if
it has been severed without the consent of the mortgagee, he may maintain replevin at any time before it becomes attached to and forms a part
of other realty: Dorr v. Dudderar,88 Ills.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Police Power-Nusance.-The legislature may for police purposes,
prescribe the limits of municipal bodies, enlarging or contracting them
at pleasure, and give them power to pass ordinances, to prevent nuisances,
to operate beyond their boundaries: Chi&igo Packing and Provision
Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ills.
Assessment of Benefits for Improvements- ConstitutionalLaw.-The
legislature has the constitutional power to authorize benefits to be assessed
and levied by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, upon property
adjacent to, as well as within the limits of, the city : Brooks v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 48 Md.
Such assessment is not a tax for the support of the municipal government, but a contribution from persons, whose property has been increased
in value by the opening and widening of the street in question, at least
in an amount equal to the sum they were required to pay: Id.
Taxes and special assessments for benefits stand upon widely different
grounds, and the distinction between them has been so generally recognised, that it must now be considered as settled : Id.
See CriminalLaw.
Acts done under Authority of Law.-That cannot be a nuisance such
as to give a common-law right of action, which the law authorizes:
Northern Transportation Co. v. C£iicago, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
A legislature may and often does authorize and even direct acts to be
done, which are harmful to individuals, and which without authority
would be nuisances, but in such a case, if the statute be such as the
legislature has power to pass, the acts are lawful and are not nuisances,
unless the power has been exceeded : Id.
In such grants of power, a right to compensation for consequential
injuries caused by the authorized erections, may be given to those who
suffer, but then the right is a creature of the statute. It has no existence without it : Id.
Where a tunnel was authorized to be constructed by an act of the
legislature of the state, and directed by an ordinance of the city councils: Held, that the city was not liable for consequential damages to
adjoining owners: Id
Persons appointed or authorized by law to make or improve a highway are not answerable for consequential damages, if they act within
their jurisdiction and with care and skill : Id.
NUISANCE.

OFFICER.

Becoming a Trespasser,by Exceeding his Authority.-An officer has no
authority for threshing wheat he has levied upon in the mow, before
selling it: Stilson v. Gibbs, 40 Mich.
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An officer who is sued on the ground that he exceeded his authority,
is not to be presumed to have been justified by extraordinary circumstances, but has the burden of showing the necessity of his action : ]d.
Where an officer, by abuse of his authority, renders himself technically liable as trespasser ab initio, and is sued therefor, the jury may
nevertheless in their discretion limit the award of damages to the
pl'aintiff's actual injury : Id.
If an officer with an execution misuses the property levied upon, he
is liable to the execution-debtor therefor, and possibly to the creditor
also, if the sale on the execution fails to satisfy the judgment : Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Dissolution-Distributionof Assets-.Equity.-As long as the debts
of a partnership are outstanding, it is irregular to undertake to distribute any assets thereof amongst the partners. The right of any
partner or his representative extends only to his share of any surplus,
after all of the liabilities of the firm have been discharged. It is the duty
of each partner to aid in the final settlement of the business of the
firm. If the firm have been finally dissolved, this duty of the partners
would still continue; it had to be wound up, their assets if any, applied to
the discharge of their liabilities-steps taken to recover any effects
belonging to the partnership; receipts, acquittances or discharges given
and a final ascertainment of the condition of the firm: Hall, Adm'r v.
Clagett, 48 Md.
The powers of the partners were co-ordinate, whether the partnership was in active operation, or subsisted only for the purpose of 'winding up the affairs thereof, and it was the duty of each partner to keep
precise accounts of all his own transactions for the firm, and to have
them at all times ready for inspection : Id.
If there have been a total failure to do this, it affords a good reason
for a court of equity to decline to supply them, without a sufficient
reason or excuse for the omission : Id.
A court of equity will not grope its way in utter darkness and undertake to create and establish a claim upon mere contingencies, or the preponderance of mere possibilities or probabilities. There is no duty
devolving on it to assume the impracticable task of adjusting the relative rights of partners, when the proof is utterly deficient and inconclusive : Id.
Disssolution by Death-Surviving Partners.-A firm is dissolved by
the death of a partner: Jenness v. Carleton, 40 Mich.
A surviving partner cannot bind co-survivors by signing the firm
name, without their express authority or ratification; Id.
PATENT.

See United States Courts.
PLEADING.

Declaring upon E lpress Contract between Other Parties.-A plaintiff
declaring specially upon an express contract between third persons alone,
must aver his title and then make out by evidence the same contract
as that set forth in his declaration, and his right and title as alleged
Rose v. Jackson, 40 Mich.
The right to sue upon a contract as assignee, must be positively
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averred, and an allegation of the assignment in the consolidated common counts will not support a recovery upon a special count in which
it is not averred. Nor would a mere additional allusion to the assignment in the special count be sufficient : Id.'
POSSESSION.

When adverse.-If one takes possession of the land of another, believing and claiming it to be his own, his possession is adverse. It is only
where he occupies by mistake and with no intention of claiming any
thing which does not belong to him, that it is not adverse : Walbrunn
v. Ballen, 68 Mo.
A proposal from one in the possession of land to buy out the holder
of the true title, does not necessarily amount to a recognition of this title,
or an acknowledgment that the possession is not adverse: Id.
RECEIVER.
Power to Sue in another State.-A receiver appointed in a foreign
jurisdiction, clothed with authority to take the designated property,
wherever situate, may sustain a suit for such property in the courts of
this state: Hurd v. Elizabeth, 12 Vroom.
This is the rule whenever the creditors of the person represented by
the receiver do not intervene : Id.
SALE.
Agreement that Title not to pass-Sale by Vendee.-If a party buys
corn under an agreement, that if it does not prove to be of grade
No. 2, in the place to which it is to be shipped, the title is not to pass,
but it shall be subject to the disposal of the vendor, and such purchaser
through his agent, sells the same after it is inspected and rejected as
No. 2, he will be liable for the price received by him to the vendor:
Burns v. Mays, 88 Ills.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

Control of Equity over Contracts-Demandfor Performance.-Stipulations not actually made and to which the parties might not have
assented, cannot be imported into a contract, however equitable they may
be: _Nims v. Vaugh, 40 Mich.
Where a demand for specific performance has once been made and
refused, it is not necessary to repeat it under similar circumstances
before suing to compel it: Id.
A decree in chancery is no bar to a suit that does not involve the
same questions, even though they might have been brought into the
first case by a cross-bill, but were not: Td.
Specific performance will not be refused as inequitable because of
the fluctuation of values, where the court has no means of knowing what
bearing the contract had on the negotiations of the parties: Id.
STATUTE.
Exemption from Taxation.-A statute exempting property from levy
and sale, is not to be construed strictly, but so as to carry out the obvious
intention of the legislature: Washburn v. Goodheart, 88 Ills.
Where property is exempt from execution, the debtor may sell, mort-
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gage or pledge it as he pleases, without making it liable to levy and salu
under execution: Id.
TAXATION.

See- Junicipal Corporation; Statute.

TRIAL.
Scintilla of Evidence--Questionsfor the Jury.-Where there is only a
scintilla of evidence on any essential fact the case should be taken from
the jury: Conely v. McDonald, 40 Mich.
Where the evidence has a legal tendency to make out a proper case in
all its parts, its weight and sufficiency, however slight, is a question for
the jury alone: Id.
Where a jury's finding of an essential fact is wholly unsupported by
evidence, it is erroneous as matter of law, but where it is supported by
any evidence, however slight, it is a finding of fact and cannot be reviewed on writ of error: Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.

Purchaseronforeclosure made Trustee for the benefit of a prior Grantee
whose rights should have been protected.-Contractingparties must not
act in bad faith to third persons who are in such relations to either as
to be affected by their agreement or its consequences: Huxley v. Rice,
40 Mich.
A transaction that is in fraud of one's rights may be construed in
equity so as to be a means of saving and protecting them : Id.
Where a conveyance is obtained for fraudulent ends or under oppressive circumstances, the party deriving title is converted into a trustee,
if necessary, for administering relief: Id.
One who has sold mortgaged land with warranty and has covenanted
to pay off the mortgage, cannot make title in himself as against his
grantee by allowing foreclosure and redeeming the land : 1d.
K. sold to H. a parcel out of a lot which he had mortgaged and then
allowed the mortgage to be foreclosed upon the whole lot, and by a collusive arrangement with R. in his own interest but in fraud of H.'s
rights, the lot was bid in by R., who then refused to release to H. except upon terms. Held, that R. should be considered as holding H.'s
parcel as trustee for H.'s benefit, and so far as H. was concerned, as
K.'s mortgagee: Id.
Revocation.-Where a party makes another trustee of notes endorsed
and delivered by her to him, not only for her own benefit, but also for
the benefit of the makers of the notes, the trustee being one, she cannot
revoke the same, nor will a court of equity revoke the same, where no
abuse of the trust is shown : Light v. Scott, 88 Ills.
UNITED STATES COURTS.

Suits between itizens of the same State about Patents.-A suit between citizens of the same state cannot be sustained in a Circuit Court
of the United States as arising under the patent laws, where there is no
denial of the validity of the plaintiff's patent, where its use is admitted,
and where a subsisting contract is shown governing the rights of the
arties in the use of the invention: Hartellet al. v. Tilghman, S. C.
U.S., Oct. Term 1878.
Relief in such an action is founded on the contract, and not on the
patent laws of the United States: Id.

